Bradford F. Hinze şi Irfan A. Omar (eds.), Heirs of Abraham. The Future of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian Relations Maryknoll, New York, 2005.

Background Only a few studies have been conducted to assess physicians’ knowledge of legal standards. Nevertheless, prior research has demonstrated a dearth of medical law knowledge. Our study explored physicians’ awareness of legal provisions concerning informed consent and confidentiality, which are essential components of the physician-patient relationship of trust. -/- Methods A cross-sectional study assessed attending physicians’ legal knowledge of informed consent and confidentiality regulations. The study was conducted in nine hospitals in Dolj County, Romania. Physicians were given a questionnaire (...) with ten scenarios and instructed to select the response that best reflected their practice. We assessed the responses of physicians who claimed their practice to be entirely legal. Their legal knowledge was evaluated by comparing their answers to applicable laws. We also calculated a score for the physicians who admitted to committing a legal breach. -/- Results Of the 305 respondents, 275 declared they never committed any law violation. However, their median correct answer score was 5.35 ± 1.66 out of 10. The specialty was the strongest predictor of legal knowledge, with emergency physicians rating the lowest and non-surgical physicians scoring the highest. Physicians who worked in both private and public sectors were better knowledgeable about legal issues than those who worked exclusively in the public sector. Results indicate that physicians are aware of the patient’s right to informed consent but lack comprehensive understanding. While most physicians correctly answered simple questions, only a tiny minority identified the correct solution when confronted with ethical dilemmas. The physicians who acknowledged breaching the law, on the other hand, had a slightly higher knowledge score at 5.45 ± 2.18. -/- Conclusion Legal compliance remains relatively low due to insufficient legal awareness. Physicians display limited awareness of legal requirements governing patient autonomy, confidentiality, and access to health data. Law should be taught in all medical schools, including undergraduate programs, to increase physicians’ legal knowledge and compliance. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough the Covid-19 epidemic challenged existing medical care norms and practices, it was no excuse for unlawful conduct. On the contrary, legal compliance proved essential in fighting the pandemic. Within the European legal framework for the pandemic, patients were still entitled to be treated equally, by a specialized physician, with the possibility of seeking a second medical opinion, in a confidential setting, following prior and informed consent. This study examines physicians’ practices regarding patients’ rights during the Covid-19 pandemic and the (...) effects of age, experience, and specialty on physicians’ behavior and preferences. Additionally, it explores the nexus of malpractice complaints, malpractice fear, and legal compliance.MethodsA cross-sectional study was conducted on a convenience sample of attending physicians and general practitioners to assess compliance with patients’ rights regulations. Respondents were physicians practicing in private and public settings in Southwestern Romania from July 2021 to May 2022.Results396 attending physicians and 109 general practitioners participated in the research. Attending physicians acknowledged patients’ rights in 55.7% of statements, while general practitioners showed a slightly higher level of compliance at 59.9%. Emergency and Anesthesia and Intensive Care physicians showed the lowest compliance. There were no significant behavioral differences based on physicians’ age, years in practice, work sector, or location. However, when faced with the question of prioritizing treatment for patients with similar medical conditions, 46.2% of attending physicians reported favoring the younger patients. This preference was common among physicians under 39. Additionally, over half of the attending physicians reported working outside their area of expertise due to staff shortages. Malpractice fear was high among physicians, although unrelated to patients’ claims, legal compliance, or working outside the scope of practice. It resulted in pressure and behavioral changes.ConclusionAdherence to patients’ rights was low during the Covid-19 pandemic. Physicians could benefit from educational and administrative support to ensure better legal compliance. Further research is needed to determine if this behavior persists beyond the pandemic context. (shrink)

"As novelist and poet Andrei Codrescu points out in the essay that accompanies this selection of photographs from the Getty Museum's collection, Evans's photographs are the work of an artist whose temperament was distinctly at odds with Beals's impassioned rhetoric. Evans's photographs of Cuba were made by a young, still maturing artist who - as Codrescu argues - was just beginning to combine his early, formalist aesthetic with the social concerns that would figure prominently in his later work."--Jacket.

Social conventions are those arbitrary rules and norms governing the countless behaviors all of us engage in every day without necessarily thinking about them, from shaking hands when greeting someone to driving on the right side of the road. In this book, Andrei Marmor offers a pathbreaking and comprehensive philosophical analysis of conventions and the roles they play in social life and practical reason, and in doing so challenges the dominant view of social conventions first laid out by David (...) Lewis. Marmor begins by giving a general account of the nature of conventions, explaining the differences between coordinative and constitutive conventions and between deep and surface conventions. He then applies this analysis to explain how conventions work in language, morality, and law. Marmor clearly demonstrates that many important semantic and pragmatic aspects of language assumed by many theorists to be conventional are in fact not, and that the role of conventions in the moral domain is surprisingly complex, playing mostly an auxiliary and supportive role. Importantly, he casts new light on the conventional foundations of law, arguing that the distinction between deep and surface conventions can be used to answer the prevalent objections to legal conventionalism. Social Conventions is a much-needed reappraisal of the nature of the rules that regulate virtually every aspect of human conduct. (shrink)

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By revealing (...) the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this paper, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism—which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful “essences”—emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the paper, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevens' K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this paper illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology. (shrink)

Mainstream political liberals hold that state coercion is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Critics argue that this public justification principle is self-defeating, because it depends on moral justifications that not all may reasonably be expected to accept. To rebut the self-defeat objection, I elaborate on the following disjunction: one either agrees or disagrees that it is wrong to impose one’s morality on others by the coercive power (...) of the state. Those who disagree reject PJP, they understand politics as war. Those who agree accept PJP, they understand politics as competition. Political competitors abide by PJP to avoid politics as war, by enforcing PJP on political combatants they engage in a war that is unavoidable. In both cases their exercise of political power has a justification that is reasonably acceptable to all. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the values supported by scientists can have a role in episodes of theory choice. In the first part, I characterize the value- and the rulebased accounts of theory choice. In the second part, I analyze how the thesis of underdetermination of theory by empirical data can be used to argue for a value-based account. I discuss two versions of the underdetermination thesis, arguing that the weaker version, underdetermination by the evidence available at a particular (...) time, is sufficient for establishing the role of values in theory selection. Many authors distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive values, considering that only the former ones have a legitimate role in theory choice. I defend this distinction, showing that it has both a normative and a descriptive dimension. I argue that cognitive values must not be seen as indicators of truth, but they can be characterized by their relation to the goal of science. In the end, I argue that, in spite of being justified and useful, the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values is not clear-cut. (shrink)

New perspectives on the various aspects of the theme of tradition in the Middle Ages.00The volume studies how philosophical traditions were understood and discussed in the middle ages and how they were used in formulating new ones. In addition, it analyzes the extent to which historians have reconstructed the subject. Bringing together seventeen case studies ranging from Hugues de Saint-Victor to Pietro Pomponazzi, the volume presents an all-encompassing perspective on the theme of "tradition".0.

Heymeric de Campo († 1460) discusses the Trinity several times in a largely unpublished metaphysical treatise, the Colliget principiorum. This paper analyses only some of these references, especially in relation to the creation of the world, which Heymeric understands in two stages : first as a creation in thought by the Father in the Son, and then as an outflow from the Trinity through the participation of the Holy Spirit. To better situate this position in the medieval context, the paper (...) shows that some authors associate the thesis of creation in the Word with the archetypal world of Plato’s Timaeus, while others reject it, such as Albert the Great. Heymeric de Campo chooses an intermediate path : he accepts that creation in the Son is the archetypal world, but he stresses that the latter neither exists nor acts outside the Trinity. This can be interpreted as a reaction against the Prague realists (Jerome of Prague and John Hus) condemned at the Council of Constance. Heymeric draws on Albert’s interpretation of Proposition IV of the Liber de causis to show that God’s going out from the Trinity is through a particular type of flow of the first created being. This first created being is a third kind of being, neither that of the Creator nor that of the creature, but creation. It is passage and becoming, that by which God manifests himself and allows himself to be known. Heymeric calls it quid neutrum and quo fit, an indeterminate being, simple but filled with forms, both finite and infinite, a form without form, but informing and transporting forms (in an inchoative manner). Yet it is the subject of metaphysics, and that opens a different perspective from that of the onto‑theology to which we are accustomed. (shrink)

The intrinsic merit of Northoff's model lies primarily in the fact that it integrates data concerned with different levels of organization of the brain. This approach implicitly argues against reductionism, although, apparently, its rather simplistic assumption gives too many degrees of freedom. In considering that a symptom from two different syndromes indicates a common neural alteration, we grossly disregard neural plasticity.

Even though Pietraszewski acknowledges the tentative nature of the theory and the multiple lines of adjacent research needed to flesh it out, he insists that the finite set of primitives he identified is necessary and sufficient for defining social groups in the context of conflict. In this commentary I expose three interrelated conundrums that cast doubt on this simplistic presumption.

U ovom radu pokusacemo da ponudimo opstiji nacrt za razmatranje odnosa izmedju toga kako se na pitanje religijske tolerancije gleda u dva dokumenta koja hriscanska i islamska religijska tradicija priznaju i slave. Rec je o Milanskom ediktu i o Ustavu Medine. Ovi dokumenti su za svoje vreme bili revolucionarni. Medjutim, sami ovi dokumenti, kao i religijska ucenja, na kojima su oni zasnovani, ne mogu biti merilo za uredjivanje odnosa u nase vreme. Oni su izlozeni u pojmovnom okviru i u vrednosnom (...) sistemu koji je vladao u doba kada su ta ucenja i ti dokumenti nastali. Mnogi odnosi koji su tada postojali, danas ne postoje. Na primer, u Milanskom ediktu afirmise se opste pravo na religiju, a u Ustavu Medine uzajamna tolerancija avramovskih monoteistickih religija, dok se osobe koje danas nazivamo ateistima ili agnosticima uopste pominju. (shrink)

One can know how to ride a bicycle, play the cello, or collect experimental data. But who can know how to properly ride a tandem bicycle, perform a symphony, or run a high-energy physics experiment? Reductionist analyses fail to account for these cases strictly in terms of the individual know-how involved. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow from non-reductionism that groups possess this know-how. One must first show that epistemic extension cannot obtain. This is the idea that individuals can possess knowledge even (...) when others possess some of the epistemic materials generating it. I show that only knowledge-that can be epistemically extended, not knowledge-how. Appeal to epistemic extension is a viable way of avoiding group knowledge-that ascriptions but not group knowledge-how ascriptions. Therefore, groups can know how. (shrink)

Cohen’s “Logic of Pure Knowledge” marks a transformation of transcendental philosophy through its new and radical interpretation of pure thinking. For Cohen, thought is in its essence creative and needs no external elements in order to produce knowledge. This study is an attempt to reconstruct the way in which Cohen understands how thinking can create its pure content from nothing. My thesis is that Kant’s distinction between the determinable and the determining I offers the theoretical context in which the productivity (...) of thinking in Cohen’s system can be understood. Thinking creates its pure content by questioning the nothing that stands before it. (shrink)

. The purpose of this essay is to argue that considerations of fairness play an essential role in the justification of democratic decision procedures. The first part argues that considerations of fairness form part of a practical authority's legitimacy, and that in the political context, those considerations of fairness entail a principle of equal distribution of political power. Subsequently, the article elaborates on the kind of equality which is required in democratic procedures, arguing that different principles of equality should apply (...) to the deliberation and the decision stages of democracy. Finally, the article concludes with a few sketchy remarks on the possible relations between considerations of fairness and soundness of democratic procedures. (shrink)

I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.

Late ancient and early medieval narratives often depict dreaming as a vertical and hierarchical process of influence that has its starting point in a higher entity and ends with the human being. This model of explanation seems to take a more horizontal approach with the advent of a new natural philosophy and medical works from Arabic milieu that put the psychosomatic processes of the human being into perspective. The general purpose of this paper is to assess to which extent Albert (...) the Great’s consideration of dreams can be taken as an example of this turning point. Specifically, it tries to show how his dream theory is articulated in De homine. The main hypothesis is that the Dominican friar advocated a materialistic account of dreams, in which the process of dream formation is explain as a flux of bodiness caused by a change in the thermal behavior of the body. (shrink)

In some recent work on omissions, it has been argued that the causal theory of action cannot account for how agency is exercised in intentionally omitting to act in the same way it explains how agency is exercised in intentional action. Thus, causalism appears to provide us with an incomplete picture of intentional agency. I argue that causalists should distinguish causalism as a general theory of intentional agency from causalism as a theory of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that, while (...) intentional actions may best be understood as the causal products or outcomes of causings, we should identify exercises of intentional agency with causal processes. With a causalist account of intentional agency sketched, I respond to the challenge to causalism from omissions. I argue that when an agent intentionally omits there is a causal process that has a zero-sum outcome. But the causal process is sufficient to make it true that the agent exercises intentional agency in intentionally omitting. (shrink)

In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.

In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best (...) conceived of as a sub-doxastic venture that involves pragmatically assuming that God exists. (shrink)

In Philosophy of Law, Andrei Marmor provides a comprehensive analysis of contemporary debates about the fundamental nature of law—an issue that has been at the heart of legal philosophy for centuries. What the law is seems to be a matter of fact, but this fact has normative significance: it tells people what they ought to do. Marmor argues that the myriad questions raised by the factual and normative features of law actually depend on the possibility of reduction—whether the legal (...) domain can be explained in terms of something else, more foundational in nature. In addition to exploring the major issues in contemporary legal thought, Philosophy of Law provides a critical analysis of the people and ideas that have dominated the field in past centuries. It will be essential reading for anyone curious about the nature of law. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to explore some of the main pragmatic aspects of communication within the legal context. It will be argued that in some crucial respects, the pragmatics of legal language is unique, involving considerations that are not typically present in ordinary conversational contexts. In particular, certain normative considerations that are typically settled in a regular conversational context are unresolved and potentially contentious in the legal case. On the other hand, the essay also argues that a careful (...) distinction between various pragmatic aspects of language use enables us to offer some generalizations about types of pragmatic enrichment that could be taken to form, or not to form, part of what is actually determined by legal expressions. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in epistemic agency among philosophers. This development is in part owing to a growing interest in mental agency and epistemic normativity, along with associated concepts such as epistemic responsibility and the relationship between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. Most authors have focused solely on our agency exercised in the process of acquiring or forming beliefs in response to reasons. But some have examined temporally extended procedural epistemic agency, in particular our agency (...) exercised in the process of inquiry. In this article, I argue for an account of procedural epistemic normativity grounded in a conception of the constitutive aim of inquiry. In doing so I will examine how an account of the constitutive aim of inquiry may both differ from and be like accounts of the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of intentional action. I propose that the constitutive aim of inquiry is understanding and that the aim of understanding may provide us with the norms of inquiry. (shrink)

Father André Scrima emphasised in his works the importance of monasticism as an inward phenomenon of the church, and he even believed that the Orthodox Church can be considered a 'monastic' church, given that monasticism is itself ecclesial. Trying to explain this ecclesial function, Father Scrima developed a unique, fresh vision regarding the role that the monk had throughout history, and this article sought to summarise some of these observations as they emerged from the writings of Father Scrima. CONTRIBUTION: The (...) article focuses on Father Scrima and argues that this remarkable Romanian theologian is often overlooked. He was gifted with an incredible memory and an outstanding capacity to bring together information from different fields of knowledge - the so-called classical culture - with universal cultural elements, patterns, traits or institutions that are common to all human cultures worldwide, presenting them in a theological interpretation. (shrink)

(1997). Information science as a paradigmatic instance of a problem‐based theory. World Futures: Vol. 49, The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information, pp. 251-273.

La notion d’ordre public trouve des expressions diverses dans la norme constitutionnelle. Tantôt norme d’habilitation, tantôt moyen de conciliation entre des principes constitutionnels antagonistes, l’ordre public est un objectif de valeur constitutionnelle qui s’impose au législateur et qui est susceptible de restreindre l’exercice de certaines libertés. Plus fondamentalement, la Constitution apparaît comme une règle, par nature, d’ordre public.

The “Mind Matters” case study presents an opportunity for students in a wide range of courses such as business ethics, organizational behavior, leadership, marketing, and strategy to recognize and contemplate the difficult planning, the ethical challenges, and the high level of creativity necessary in many business decisions when bringing a new product or service to market. Also, this case study encourages its readers to formulate solutions and provide answers for complexproblems fraught with ethical dilemmas.

The article focuses on Alexander Bogdanov’s utopian novel The Red Star, which is interpreted as a sort of literary experimentation that, in a free artistic form, develops ideas of socialist...

Las éticas tradicionales ya no bastan para satisfacer las demandas de los poderes que el ser humano posee mediante la técnica. El desarrollo de la tecnología ha despertado en la humanidad una serie de preocupaciones que demandan reflexiones éticas sobre lo que es realmente valioso: la vida. La humanidad necesita con urgencia sabiduría para emplear responsablemente el poder que viene de la técnica. Kant propone como base de la moralidad la autonomía de la voluntad libre. Con el fin de saber (...) si existe una razón pura capaz por sí sola de determinar la voluntad sin recurrir a la sensibilidad y a la experiencia, formula una ética del deber. La propuesta de una ética de la responsabilidad de Hans Jonas contiene un nuevo imperativo: las características del principio de responsabilidad. Mostrando que el sujeto ético en la civilización tecnológica es aquel que actúa con cuidado y precaución, la ética de la responsabilidad agrega toda la naturaleza, por lo que el principio de responsabilidad consiste en que asumamos la responsabilidad de la precaución y el cuidado con comportamientos éticos que nos hagan virtuosos preocupándonos por la vida y en búsqueda de un vivir mejor. (shrink)

The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another requires a rule-governed institutional setting. To have authority is to have power, in the juridical sense of the term, and power can only be conferred by norms constituting it. Power-conferring norms are essentially institutional, and the obligation to comply with a legitimate authority's decree is, first and foremost, institutional in nature. The main argument presented in this essay is that an explanation of practical authorities is a two-stage affair: (...) the special, practical import of an authority can only be explained against the background of an institutional setting which constitutes the authority's power and the corresponding obligation to comply. However, this obligation is not an all things considered obligation, it is conditioned on reasons to participate in the relevant institution or practice. (shrink)

Andrei Timotin | : L’objectif de cette étude est de dégager la structure générale et les articulations de la théorie de la prière de Jamblique et de préciser sa place dans l’histoire du platonisme. Elle montre comment la doctrine de la prière remplace, chez Jamblique, la démonologie médio-platonicienne en tant que théorie de la médiation entre les hommes et les dieux. Cette transformation permet de comprendre l’évolution de la théorie de la prière, dans le cadre de l’histoire du platonisme, (...) d’une pratique religieuse à caractère philosophique vers une réalité d’ordre métaphysique. | : The goal of this study is to bring out the general structure and the articulations of Iamblichus’ theory of prayer and to define its place in the history of Platonism. It shows how the doctrine of prayer replaces, in Iamblichus, the Middle-Platonic demonology as a theory of mediation between men and gods. This transformation allows us to understand the evolution of the theories of prayer in the context of the history of Platonism from a religious practice with philosophical meaning to a metaphysical reality. (shrink)

The change in the organization of science education over the past fifty years is quickly recalled. Being its cultural bound the lack of a conception of the foundation of science, the multiple innovations have resulted as temporary improvements without a clear direction, apart from the technocratic goal of an automation of learning processes. The discovery of two dichotomies as the foundations of science suggests a pluralist conception of science, and hence the need to entirely renew science education, in particular by (...) introducing the notions of incommensurability and radical variations in meaning of the basic notions. This change was already anticipated by several proposals within each subject-matter. (shrink)

Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of objects and, hence, that ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ are interchangeable. In this article, I aim to disentangle dispositions from powers with the goal of getting a better sense of how powers and dispositions relate to one another. I present and defend a modest realism about dispositions built upon a standard strong realism about powers. I argue that each correct disposition-ascription we can make of an object is made (...) true by the manifestations towards which a given power or collection of powers of the object is directed.RésuméDe nombreux réalistes des pouvoirs supposent que les pouvoirs des objets sont identiques aux dispositions des objets et, par conséquent, que le « pouvoir » et la « disposition » sont interchangeables. Dans cet article, j'ai pour objectif de démêler les dispositions des pouvoirs dans le but d'avoir une meilleure idée de la façon dont les pouvoirs et les dispositions se rapportent les uns aux autres. Je présente et défends un réalisme des dispositions modeste fondées sur un réalisme des pouvoirs standard fort. Je soutiens que chaque disposition-ascription correcte que nous pouvons faire d'un objet est rendue vraie par les manifestations vers lesquelles un pouvoir donné ou une collection de pouvoirs de l'objet est dirigé. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship between acceptance and belief is sketched and defended. The (...) consequences of the distinction between belief and acceptance, and the model of belief control sketched are then applied to the recent case made by Carl Ginet in defense of the conceptual and psychological possibility of agents exercising direct voluntary control over their beliefs. n. (shrink)

MethodologyA new hypothesis on the basic features characterizing the Foundations of Mathematics is suggested.Application of the methodBy means of it, the several proposals, launched around the year 1900, for discovering the FoM are characterized. It is well known that the historical evolution of these proposals was marked by some notorious failures and conflicts. Particular attention is given to Cantor's programme and its improvements. Its merits and insufficiencies are characterized in the light of the new conception of the FoM. After the (...) failures of Frege's and Cantor's programmes owing to the discoveries of an antinomy and internal contradictions, respectively, the two remaining, more radical programmes, i.e. Hilbert's and Brouwer's, generated a great debate; the explanation given here is their mutual incommensurability, defined by means of the differences in their foundational features.ResultsThe ignorance of this phenomenon explains the inconclusiveness of a century-long debate between the advocates of these two proposals. Which however have been so greatly improved as to closely approach or even recognize some basic features of the FoM.Discussion on the resultsYet, no proposal has recognized the alternative basic feature to Hilbert's main one, the deductive organization of a theory, although already half a century before the births of all the programmes this alternative was substantially instantiated by Lobachevsky's theory on parallel lines. Some conclusive considerations of a historical and philosophical nature are offered. In particular, the conclusive birth of a pluralism in the FoM is stressed. (shrink)